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In Madness at home: the psychiatrist, the
patient, and the family in England, l820–1860,
Akihito Suzuki examines the forces that
undermined, or as he puts it, destabilized,
domestic psychiatry: the caring for lunatic
family members at home. Standard accounts
of the process by which families ‘‘lost the
treatment franchise’’ have routinely focused on
the rise of the asylum and the coming of the
(mad) doctor. But by mining an unusual
source—newspaper reports of commissions of
lunacy from l825 to l861—Suzuki has put to
marvellous effect some l96 accounts of the
actors, the language, the depositions, as well
as the public and professional reaction to the
shifting meanings of lunacy in an era noted for
qualitative change in both civil and criminal
jurisprudence. In addressing how domestic
care of the mad lost its legitimacy, he deftly
engages a host of issues dear to the heart of
historians of medicine: the vagaries that
surround a clinical diagnosis, the yawning gap
that opens between professed medical opinion
and actual medical practice, the motives
thought to animate various actors who
participated in the designation and seques-
tration of the mad in nineteenth-century
England.
It is ultimately the fine art of diagnosis that
threads its way through this comprehensive and
intelligently written study. Although readers in
medical history have grown familiar with the
proffering of professional, political, and even
venal motives believed to have framed the
Victorian medical gaze, it is frankly difficult
to finish Madness at home without a certain
compassion for the predicament facing the
period’s specialists in mental medicine. As
Suzuki makes clear, patients could actively
mislead the physician, carefully circumnavi-
gating delusional shoals to appear perfectly
sane; relatives with an eye to recovering or
protecting family property could manipulate
the physician’s inference in quite the other
direction, tendentiously embellishing the
narrative of their allegedly mad relative’s antics.
Even when supplied with a truthful history,
where was the physician to look in order to
translate florid accounts of seeming derange-
ment into a diagnosis of lunacy? The profes-
sional literature, such as it was, contained only
vague and imprecise criteria for the designation
of madness; the expressed opinion of one’s
colleagues could be just as unhelpful. If there
remain readers today who need to be reminded
of the sui generis nature of psychiatric diag-
nosis, they have only to try to name another
medical specialty whose practitioners could
advise: ‘‘an ideal ...clinical encounter was
one without the patient’’ (p. 54). George Man
Burrows, the author of this particular sentiment,
would pay dearly for his self-regarding skills:
he was brought low in a legal action that
resulted from signing a lunacy certificate
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subject of the commission’s inquiry.
Among the voices ridiculing the unfortunate
Dr Burrows were those of his medical collea-
gues, who faulted him and fellow ‘‘exclusive
monopolizersofinsanity’’forbeingalltooeager
to sign certificates of insanity. To the historian
of psychiatric diagnosis, however, the problem
was not only a readiness to diagnose lunacy,
but the paucity of substantive criteria to discern
a degree of mental derangement that could
justifiably deprive someone of both his personal
and economic liberty. One notes instead the
frequent use of ‘‘unsoundness of mind’’ to
support an inference of lunacy. This is a forensic
term with an ancient pedigree in the common
law: the first recorded acquittal of a criminal
defendant in England (l505) cited ‘‘unsound
mind’’ to characterize the accused’s mental
state. Invoked three centuries later to inform the
work of lunacy commissions, the term had lost
none of its hopelessly opaque character and flew
in the face of delusion, monomania, melan-
cholia, and even ‘‘lesion of the will’’, the era’s
more familiar diagnoses. Readers may wonder
why these states of being—on the lips of
both medical men and the London populace—
featured so rarely in a finding of lunacy.
Unsound mind, after all, had no direct medical
significance; it defied clear description and
admitted of no diagnostic criteria.
A medical term with more forensic traction
was moral insanity, coined by James Cowles
Prichard. Testifying in both criminal and civil
jurisdiction, medical witnesses had found
themselves constrained by the law’s preference
for diagnoses that turned on the existence of
delusion. The reliance on cognitive confusion—
a fateful error in belief, an insistent, intruding
idea—was designed to restrict the jury’s con-
sideration of insanity to a question of knowing
thatanactwaswrong.Delusion wasnotonlythe
term of preference for the courts; many medical
men also insisted that a derangement of intellect
(alone) defined insanity. Other medical voices,
however, advanced the notion that insanity
could be revealed in a derangement of the moral
sentiments: how one ought to feel towards one’s
children, one’s friends or one’s lovers. Violent
actions that stemmed from no logical, coherent
reason—indeed aggressive behaviour that
imperilled the perpetrator for no reason at all—
was ascribed to a moral insanity precisely
because it made no sense. Moral insanity had
particular utility to medical witnesses when
lunacy commissions considered the narrative of
a suspected madman who failed to show proper
respect for property. In fact, medical men were
capable of reframing delusion itself into purely
behavioural terms: a ‘‘delusion of manner’’ was
invoked to diagnose inappropriate behaviour.
Most often, though, it was moral insanity that
medical witnesses introduced, which Suzuki
maintains was conceived by Prichard ‘‘first and
foremost as a means to save the family from
financial ruin’’ (p. 84).
It is of course not hard to see how a family’s
anxiety for its economic future could have
influenced the medical man’s proclivity to find
moral insanity. One could also argue that his
respect for the patient’s own liberty might have
encouragedthemaddoctortoerrontheopposite
side, deducing singularity of character rather
than manifest derangement. This is the stark
choice facing the physician in Suzuki’s account,
but one wonders if the motives of the physician
were really a question of ‘‘either/or’’: for the
family (or) forthe patient.Volitional, in contrast
to intellectual, impairment had its own history,
predating Prichard’s creation of moral insanity.
Earlier in the century, Philippe Pinel had
advanced the notion ofa mania without delirium
(delusion):anautonomousfurythatimpelledthe
afflicted into acts that admitted of no logical
motivation. Pinel’s innovative nosology, as well
asthatofhisacolytes,EsquirolandGeorget,was
thought to rest on first-hand clinical experience
with a wide array of patients. To focus on the
grounds for medical theorizing is not to contend
that (all) the clinician did was to read madness
in the mind of the deranged. Certainly an array
of professional and personal motives could
have contributed to the creation of a new type
of diagnostic term, and yet one needs to
reserve some consideration for the cognitive
aims of the physician himself, and how these
could have been influenced by the availability
of a range of medical cases of the distracted.
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bolstered one interest at the expense of the other
is undeniable, but the medical effort to supply a
forensic diagnosis may reveal at least as much
about the evolving experience clinicians drew
upon as it does the personally-felt pull to one
side or the other.
It is also good to remember that moral
insanity was far from universally accepted by
medical specialists in insanity. John Connolly,
himself no stranger to courtroom testimony,
believed that such a diagnosis threatened ‘‘every
eccentric man [to be] actually in danger of
beingtreatedasamadman’’(p.74).Itseemsodd
that similar sentiments were not prominently
voiced by the bench in the accounts that Suzuki
has unearthed. In America during the same
period, moral insanity invoked in court hearings
concerning contested wills sparked a visceral
reaction among American judges, to the point
where they were willing to accept any testator’s
behavioural anomaly as evidence of singularity
of character rather than madness—so deter-
mined was the effort to keep moral insanity out
of their courtrooms. One might have expected
English judges (or voices in the legal estab-
lishment) to react with similar disquiet at such
an obvious expansion of the grounds for finding
lunacy. They were certainly not reluctant to
voice their disapproval of moral insanity when
introduced at the Old Bailey in criminal trials
during the same years covered in this work.
Granted there is a qualitative difference in
broadening the grounds for acquitting a suspect
of a violent act in contrast to declaring a person
lunatic, and yet issues of personal liberty ren-
dered the lunacy commissions a dramatic and
consequential forum. In both civil and criminal
settings, medical witnesses were advancing a
form of mental derangement uniquely—one
might even say purposely—fitted to the legal
issue at hand. The plea to respect questions of
equity and justice was certainly on the lips of
many of the medical men and medical writers;
were they not joined by anxious voices on the
English bench?
Perhaps legal anxiety was allayed by the very
prominent role that lay interpretations of
madness were playing in the diagnoses of
madness that surfaced in the lunacy commis-
sions. Among the many important insights in
Suzuki’s narrative is his underscoring of the
enduring influence of family and lay under-
standing of madness, especially given the
increasing frequency of the medical specialists
in court. In a telling observation, he notes
how professional authority and influence may
have actually moved away from psychiatric
opinion during this period, providing an
important corrective to the notion that medical
dominance in matters of social and legal
administration is either inevitable or linear.
Along the way, the author provides further
debunking insights: the manner in which moral
treatment was rooted in previous family patterns
of care, the related and largely unexamined
ways in which ‘‘domestic psychiatry’’ appears
to have operated as a controlling, carceral
setting, appearing to resemble the asylum
in everything but record keeping.
Above all, the reader will find a renewed
appreciation for the role religion played in
‘‘destabilizing’’ the family’s claims to pride of
place in the treatment of madness. Although
the influence of Evangelical religion is more
suggested than argued explicitly, the reader
will come away from Suzuki’s thoughtful
and comprehensive narrative with a healthy
respect for the array of formidable social
forces other than medical that worked to
wrest control of the lunatic from the clutches
of the family.
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